The controls, named once
Attacks in scope
Help desk social engineering
Attack. The caller talks an agent into a password reset or MFA re-enrollment with a plausible story, personal details scraped from LinkedIn, and urgency. Controls. The agent sends a verification instead of judging the story. By default the link goes to the directory contact, so the caller must hold the real user’s phone or mailbox. The use case’s rules pick a flow by directory group, so an executive gets Face plus Proofing regardless of how convincing the call is. Audit records the agent’s search, preview, and request so the sequence is reconstructable. Overrides are not a button; a failed request stays failed. Limits. Knowledge questions drawn from directory attributes are weak against a researched attacker. Use them only as a fallback and only on attributes that are not public.SIM swap
Attack. The attacker ports the user’s number and receives SMS codes and links. Controls. SMS is one factor among several, and a column that contains Face or Proofing cannot be passed by SMS alone. Use case rules can keep SMS out of the flows high-value groups get. Email delivery to the directory mailbox is unaffected by a port. Limits. SMS is weaker than email where phone numbers are poorly maintained, and in most directories they are. If a column is SMS alone, a SIM swap defeats it. Treat SMS as a convenience factor, not a security one.Deepfake video and camera injection
Attack. A synthetic face, a replayed recording, or a virtual camera feeding the browser. Controls. Liveness runs on streamed video, not a single uploaded frame, and the comparison is against a trusted reference the attacker did not supply. Document checks run the vendor’s own injection and presentation-attack detection on the selfie. Limits. No biometric method is perfect. Liveness vendors publish detection rates, not guarantees, and injection techniques improve. Pair Face with a second factor in the same column for the populations that matter most, and keep attempt limits tight so an attacker cannot iterate.Replayed selfies
Attack. A photo or video of the real user, taken from social media, shown to the camera. Controls. Liveness is designed for exactly this: a printed photo or a screen replay fails the depth and motion checks. The match score is only consulted after liveness passes. Limits. The same as above. Liveness reduces the attack to the hard case; it does not remove it.Stolen or borrowed ID document
Attack. The attacker presents a real document that is not theirs, or a document bought to match a target name. Controls. The Proofing factor requires a selfie that matches the document photo, with liveness. Name binding rejects a genuine document in the wrong name. When Proofing photo is on, the selfie from a passed check becomes the face reference, so a later Face check compares against the person who held the document, not a stale directory photo. Limits. A stolen document plus a lookalike attacker is the residual case. Document checks are as good as the vendor’s authenticity analysis for that document type and country.Phishing of verification links
Attack. The attacker sends a fake verification message to harvest credentials, or convinces the user to forward a real link. Controls. A verification link never asks for a password. It is single use, short lived, and bound to a specific request and use case. The verification page is branded under your Branding settings so a lookalike is easier to spot. Where exclusive sessions are enabled for your workspace, the first browser to open a link holds it. Limits. TruU cannot stop a user from acting on a message that did not come from TruU. Brief users that a verification link arrives only after they, or an agent they are talking to, requested one. See What to expect during verification.Insider with directory write access
Attack. Someone who can edit Entra ID changes a target’s phone, email, or photo, then requests a verification that routes to themselves. Controls. Directory changes are outside TruU, but the request is not. Audit shows who requested the verification and which contact value it went to, masked, so a reviewer can line it up against the directory change log. A trusted reference photo from a passed document check does not change when the directory photo does. Face and Proofing columns do not depend on contact values at all. Limits. TruU reads your directory and trusts it. An attacker who controls the directory can weaken delivery-based factors. Put Face or Proofing in the primary column for privileged populations, and alert on contact-attribute changes in your own directory audit.Link forwarding
Attack. The real user receives a legitimate link and hands it to someone else, willingly or under pressure. Controls. Face and Proofing bind the link to a person, not a device: the forwarded link still has to pass liveness against the user’s reference. Short lifetimes shrink the window. Where exclusive sessions are enabled, a second browser is refused while the first holds the session. Limits. A user who sits next to the attacker and completes the face step for them has not been impersonated; they have colluded. That is an HR and conduct problem, and the audit trail will show the user passed.What TruU IDV does not claim
- No biometric method is perfect. Liveness and face comparison have false accept and false reject rates. TruU shows factor strength and assurance bands, not a guarantee.
- Knowledge questions are weak. They depend on directory data the attacker may have researched and that is often stale. Use them as a fallback for low-risk populations.
- SMS is weaker than email where numbers are poorly maintained, and it is exposed to SIM swap. Check coverage before building a column on it.
- TruU trusts your directory. A compromised directory weakens any factor that reads from it.
- TruU does not detect compromise of the user’s own device. A malware-controlled phone that passes a live face check is the user, as far as the check can tell.
Choosing columns against this model
See Flows for the column model and How use cases work for assigning flows to groups.
Related pages
Product security
The properties that make these controls hold.
Factors
Each factor’s strength and requirements.
Audit events
Reconstructing an attack after the fact.

