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Updated November 12, 2026

Summary

Defer Nuvoton NPCT7xx TPM firmware updates on Windows devices where TruU is in use. Microsoft, Lenovo, HP and Dell are shipping these updates to fix two Nuvoton TPM vulnerabilities, and installing them unenrolls TruU users on the device. TruU is building a migration that lets devices take the update while keeping users enrolled. We will notify customers when it is available.

The vulnerabilities

Nuvoton has published fixes for two vulnerabilities in NPCT7xx TPM firmware. CVE-2026-6726: information leakage via falsified TPM keys. A local attacker with elevated privileges can get a TPM-aware certificate authority to issue a credential for a falsified TPM key. The attacker can then produce fraudulent TPM 2.0 attestations that appear to come from a genuine TPM. The flaw is in the TCG reference code (CERT VU#431093), so TPMs from several vendors are affected. CVSS vector: AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N. CVE-2026-6727: RSA OAEP timing side channel. Timing differences in RSA OAEP decryption padding checks can leak information about the decrypted plaintext to a local attacker.

OEM firmware updates

These OEM updates carry the fixes. Each one unenrolls TruU users on the device it is installed on.

Impact on TruU

After the update, TruU users on the device are unenrolled and must re-enroll before they can sign in with TruU. TruU protects the keys behind each user’s credentials with the device TPM. The firmware update does not clear the TPM. It changes how keys re-created from the TPM’s primary key protect their child keys, which invalidates the TPM-protected keys behind existing TruU enrollments. TruU confirmed this on November 11, 2026, on an HP EliteBook 840 G11 updated from 7.2.3.1 to 7.2.5.1. Two cases need extra attention:
  • Lenovo: devices that already received 7.2.5.0 will receive 7.2.5.1, which unenrolls users again.
  • Dell: Dell’s procedure also clears the TPM, which removes every TPM-protected key on the device, including TruU’s.
CVE-2026-6726 concerns forged TPM key attestation. TruU does not rely on TPM key attestation today, so the vulnerability itself is not an exposure in TruU. The impact on TruU comes only from the firmware update that fixes it.

What to do

  1. Identify affected devices. In an elevated PowerShell session, run Get-Tpm. A ManufacturerIdTxt of NTC indicates a Nuvoton TPM, and ManufacturerVersion shows the current firmware version.
  2. Defer the updates on TruU-enrolled devices until TruU confirms the migration is available:
    • Microsoft Surface: use Windows Update for Business or Intune policies to defer, or require approval for, driver and firmware updates.
    • Lenovo: hold 7.2.5.0 and 7.2.5.1 in your Lenovo update tooling and Windows Update policies.
    • HP: do not deploy SoftPaq sp174106.
    • Dell: do not deploy package 32VF6.
  3. Re-enroll users on devices that already updated. [Link to re-enrollment instructions]

Weighing the security trade-off

Deferring means leaving a security fix uninstalled for now. CVE-2026-6726 requires a local attacker with elevated privileges, and its practical impact applies where a certificate authority or another service trusts TPM key attestation. If your organization relies on TPM attestation elsewhere, review this with your security team. If you decide the update must be applied now, contact TruU support and we will help you plan re-enrollment for affected users.

What TruU is doing

TruU is building a migration that will let devices take these firmware updates while keeping users’ TruU enrollments. Because Dell’s procedure clears the TPM, we will confirm separately how the migration applies to Dell devices. We will update this article and notify customers when the migration is available. [Expected timing]

References