Skip to main content
TAMS is designed so that the caller can never influence which account is unlocked, all transport is encrypted, and every operation is observable. This page describes those controls and the assumptions the deployment relies on.

​
Token-Based Authentication

Every account unlock request must include a valid OAuth2 Bearer token in the request body (token field). TAMS validates the token by calling the TruU Identity Server’s /api/v1/user/info endpoint using the token as a Bearer credential:
1

Forward the token

The token is forwarded to the Identity Server with Authorization: Bearer <token>.
2

Reject invalid tokens

If the Identity Server returns HTTP 401, TAMS returns HTTP 401 Unauthorized to the caller and the operation is aborted.
3

Extract the verified identity

On a successful response, the user’s GUID and UserPrincipalName (UPN) are extracted from the Identity Server response.
4

Use only the verified UPN

The UPN extracted from the token response is the only identity used for AD lookup. The caller cannot supply or influence which account is unlocked.

​
Transport Security

​
Input Validation

​
Audit Logging & Observability

TAMS emits operational and security-relevant signals across Windows, the TruU platform, and local logs.

​
Events

TAMS emits the following operational/security-relevant events for both unlock-flow failures and service health/runtime issues:

​
Security Boundaries & Assumptions

The deployment relies on the following assumptions. Review each before going to production.
  1. Trusted network placement. TAMS is deployed inside your trusted network. Network-layer access to the listening port should be restricted via firewall rules to only the Windows Authenticator host(s).
  2. Identity authority. TAMS trusts the TruU Identity Server as the authoritative source of user identity. The UPN used for AD operations comes exclusively from the IDS /userinfo response.
  3. Certificate lifecycle. The TRUU-HTTPS TLS certificate must be managed and renewed by your team. Expired certificates cause startup failure and are surfaced via the health check endpoint.
  4. Configuration integrity. Registry-based configuration (HKLM\SOFTWARE\TruU\AccountManagement) should be protected with appropriate ACLs to prevent tampering by non-administrative users.